UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

3-3-2014

State v. VanTassel Respondent's Brief Dckt. 41210

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"State v. VanTassel Respondent's Brief Dckt. 41210" (2014). Not Reported. 1518.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/1518

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDA 1 in

COPY

)
In the Matter of the Driving Privileges of:

)

AMY JO VAN TASSEL,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Licensee-Appellant.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent.

______________

No.41210
Ada Co. Case No.
CV-BA-2012-16313

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL
THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IN AND FOR THE

HONORABLE THOMAS P. WATKINS, Magistrate Judge
HONORABLE MICHAEL R. MCLAUGHLIN, District Judge

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division
JESSICA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P .0. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

GABRIEL J. MCCARTHY
Attorney at Law
401 W. Front Street, Ste. 302
Boise, ID 83702
(208) 343-8888

FILED· COPY
MAR - 3 2014

ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................. ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... 1
Nature Of The Case ............................................................................. 1
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings ................... 1
ISSUES ........................................................................................................... 5
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................... 6
The District Court Correctly Affirmed The Magistrate's
Determination That Van Tassel's Actions Constituted A Refusal ......... 6
A.

Introduction ................................................................................ 6

8.

Standard Of Review ................................................................... 6

C.

There Was Substantial Competent Evidence To
Support The Magistrate's Finding That Van Tassel
Refused The Requested Evidentiary Testing And
The Law Does Not Support Her Claim Of Cause ....................... 7

CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 16
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ........................................................................ 16

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

PAGE

CASES

Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829, 41 P.3d 257 (2002) .......................................... 15
In re Griffiths, 113 Idaho 364,744 P.2d 92 (1987) ...................................... passim
In re Helfrich, 131 Idaho 349,955 P.2d 1128 (Ct. App. 1998) ..................... passim
In re Smith, 115 Idaho 808,770 P.2d 817 (Ct. App. 1989) ................................... 7
Insight LLC v. Gunter, 154 Idaho 779, 302 P.3d 1052 (2013) .............................. 9
Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008) .................................. 6
Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559,633 P.2d 1137 (1981) ..................................... 7
State v. Breed, 111 Idaho 497, 725 P.2d 202 (Ct. App. 1986) ........................... 15
State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 184 P.3d 215 (Ct. App. 2008) ............................ 6
State v. Wagner, 149 Idaho 268,233 P.3d 199 (Ct. App. 2010) ......................... 7

STATUTES
I.C. § 18-8002 ................................................................................................... 7, 8

II

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Amy Jo Van Tassel appeals from the district court's appellate decision
affirming the magistrate's order suspending Van Tassel's license based on her
refusal to submit to evidentiary testing. Van Tassel claims the district court erred
because, she asserts, the magistrate's finding that she refused to submit to
evidentiary testing was not supported by substantial and competent evidence.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Officer Thomas Erickson was dispatched to an attempt to locate a
possible drunk driver.

(R., p.10.)

Upon locating the suspect vehicle, Officer

Erickson saw the car "drift to the right out of its lane of travel and nearly side
swipe[]" another vehicle. (R., p.10.) Officer Erickson stopped the vehicle and
made contact with the driver, Van Tassel. (R., p.10.) While speaking with Van
Tassel, Officer Erickson "noticed her speech was slow and thick tongued" and he
noted "a distinct odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from her breath." (R.,
p.10.) Van Tassel subsequently failed field sobriety tests and Officer Erickson
arrested her for driving under the influence. (R., p.10.) Officer Erickson asked
Van Tassel to submit to a breath test, which Van Tassel initially refused.

(R.,

p.10.) Van Tassel then agreed to perform the test, but gave insufficient breath
samples "on three separate attempts."

(R., p.10.)

As such, Officer Erickson

determined that Van Tassel refused testing and seized her license. (R., p.10.)
Van Tassel requested a hearing on whether she refused the breath
alcohol test.

(R., p.6.)

At the hearing, Van Tassel testified, in part, that she
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attempted to blow three times and was "confused" when she was told her efforts
would be considered a refusal. (Tr., p.31, L.16 - p.34, L.5.) Van Tassel further
testified that she thought she asked about a blood draw after she was told she
would be considered a refusal but if she did not ask she was "thinking that for
sure." (Tr., p.34, L.11 - p.35, L.3.)
Officer Erickson also testified at the hearing.

According to Officer

Erickson, Van Tassel was "blowing real fast. She'd take, like, a -- just one short
little breath and stop blowing." (Tr., p.56, Ls.5-7.) On the second attempt, Van
Tassel "took her lips off and pulled her head back away from the breath tube."
(Tr., p.56, Ls.16-21.)

Officer Erickson further testified there was no indication

that Van Tassel had any physical limitations in terms of providing a breath
sample. (Tr., p.67, Ls.1-6.)
The audio recording of Officer Erickson's efforts to administer the breath
test was also admitted at the refusal hearing. (Exhibit A.) Van Tassel can be
heard initially refusing the test and arguing with Officer Erickson about whether
she successfully completed all field sobriety tests.

(Exhibit A at 00: 15-00:44.)

When Officer Erickson attempts to confirm Van Tassel is refusing, Van Tassel
agrees to "take the test." (Exhibit A at 1:15-1:27.) Officer Erickson then tells Van
Tassel to take a deep breath and blow into the machine until he tells her to stop.
(Exhibit A at 1:30-1 :34.) Officer Erickson next instructs Van Tassel she needs to
"blow harder than

that," followed

(Exhibit A at 1:38-1 :43.)

by telling

her,

"you're

not blowing."

Van Tassel responds, "I was blowing," after which

Officer Erickson explains to her the testing instrument is "based on pressure."
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(Exhibit A at 1:44-1 :50.) Officer Erickson tells Van Tassel she "actually ha[s] to
blow" and "keep her lips on the end of it." (Exhibit A at 1:53-1 :58.)
After waiting two minutes for the machine to reset, Officer Erickson tells
Van Tassel, "We're going to try this again, okay" and instructs her, "once you
start blowing into it, don't stop until I tell you to stop." (Exhibit A at 4:04-4:10.)
Once again, Officer Erickson says, "you have to blow harder than that" and
reminds Van Tassel that he told her not to stop until he said to stop. (Exhibit A at
4:13-4:21.) Officer Erickson also indicates Van Tassel pulled away. (Exhibit A at
4:22-4:26.)
After approximately another 90 seconds, Officer Erickson tells Van Tassel
they will try again in 30 seconds and if they are "still having problems" it will be
"counted as a refusal." (Exhibit A at 5:42-5:52.) During the third attempt, Officer
Erickson tells Van Tassel, "keep going, keep going, keep going," followed by,
"you can't stop, you're stopping, you blow and you stop."

(Exhibit A at 6:28-

6:35.) Despite Van Tassel's insistence that she "did not stop," Officer Erickson
tells her he has given her three chances and he makes no further attempts to
obtain a breath sample.

(Exhibit at 6:39-6:40.) After the third failed attempt,

Officer Erickson and the other officer on scene can be heard on the recording
telling Van Tassel they both saw her stop and noting she was giving intermittent
breaths. (Exhibit A at 6:35-7:21.) Van Tassel persists in her claim that she "did
not stop blowing." (Exhibit A 6:36-7:20.)
The magistrate, after considering the evidence, issued a written opinion
concluding Van Tassel "was given adequate information as to how to complete
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the test, and despite three attempts, she failed to comply. She gave no logical
reason to the officers as to why she couldn't complete the test, other than to say
that she was blowing as instructed. The audio recording does not bear this out."
(R., p.26.) The magistrate therefore entered an order suspending Van Tassel's

license. (R., pp.27-28.)
Van Tassel appealed to the district court, 1 and the district court affirmed
the magistrate's decision suspending Van Tassel's license. (R., pp.31-32) Van
Tassel timely appealed from the district court's appellate decision. (R., pp.6970.)

The magistrate granted Van Tassel's motion to stay the license suspension
"indefinitely pending a judicial determination of the appeal." (R., pp.29-30, 34.)
1
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ISSUES
Van Tassel states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Whether the Magistrate Court's conclusion that Ms. Van
Tassel refused to submit to evidentiary testing by conduct
was supported by substantial and competent evidence.

(Appellant's Brief, p.2.)

The state rephrases the issue as:
Under the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion in In re Griffiths, 113 Idaho 364,
744 P.2d 92 ( 1987), and in light of the evidence presented at the refusal hearing,
should this Court affirm the district court's intermediate appellate decision and
reject Van Tassel's claim that she showed good cause for her refusal based on
her assertion that the "circumstances" attendant to a DUI investigation prevented
her from providing an adequate breath sample?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Correctly Affirmed The Magistrate's Determination That Van
Tassel's Actions Constituted A Refusal
A.

Introduction
Van Tassel contends the magistrate's determination that she failed to

submit to evidentiary testing was not supported by substantial and competent
evidence. (Appellant's Brief, p.2.) According to Van Tassel, this is so because
the magistrate failed to credit her assertion that she was unable to complete the
test due to the circumstances of the DUI investigation, which were confusing and
"more difficult for her than an average person." (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) A review
of the evidence and application of the correct legal standards shows Van Tassel
failed to meet her burden of showing cause of a sufficient magnitude to justify her
refusal.

B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate

appellate capacity this Court "directly review[s] the district court's decision."
State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing
Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). The appellate court
"examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is substantial and
competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact and whether the
magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings."

lfL "If those

findings

are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if the district court
affirmed the magistrate's decision, [the appellate court] affirm[s] the district
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court's decision as a matter of procedure." ~ (citing Losser, 145 Idaho at 670,
183 P.3d 758; Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559,633 P.2d 1137 (1981)).
"The concept of refusal, as embodied in I.C. § 18-8002, has factual and
legal dimensions. When a question of refusal turns upon a determination of the
motorist's words or expressive acts, the issue is one of fact." In re Smith, 115
Idaho 808, 809, 770 P.2d 817, 818 (Ct. App. 1989) (citation omitted). "However,
when the question turns not upon whether certain things were said or done, but
upon whether such words or acts are of legal significance, then the issue is one
of law." ~; see also State v. Wagner, 149 Idaho 268, 270, 233 P.3d 199, 201
(Ct. App. 2010) ("[W]hether a driver's actions are deemed to be a refusal, within
the meaning of I.C. § 18-8002, is a question of law over which we exercise free
review.").

C.

There Was Substantial Competent Evidence To Support The Magistrate's
Finding That Van Tassel Refused The Requested Evidentiary Testing And
The Law Does Not Support Her Claim Of Cause
Pursuant to I.C. § 18-8002(1 ), "[a]ny person who drives or is in actual

physical control of a motor vehicle in this state shall be deemed to have given his
consent to evidentiary testing for concentration of alcohol" and must submit to
testing "at the request of a peace officer having reasonable grounds to believe
that person has been driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle"
while under the influence.

If a "motorist refuses to submit to or complete

evidentiary testing" his license will be suspended unless he requests a hearing
within seven days.

I.C. § 18-8002(4)(b)-(c).

If a hearing is requested, it is

"limited to the question of why the defendant did not submit to, or complete,
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evidentiary testing, and the burden of proof shall be upon the defendant." I.C. §
18-8002(b). The defendant may prevail at the hearing if he shows a valid cause
for his refusal.

In re Griffiths, 113 Idaho 364, 372, 744 P.2d 92, 100 (1987).

Ultimately the defendant "must establish cause of a sufficient magnitude that it
may be fairly said that a suspension of his license would be unjust or
inequitable." lg, at 372, 744 P.2d at 100.
Van Tassel complains, as she did below, that "the magistrate court
appears to have considered almost exclusively the sufficiency of the instruction
Officer Erickson gave to [her], not whether [she] was confused by the
circumstances or individually the test is more difficult for her than an average
person."

(Appellant's Brief, p.6; compare R., p.48.)

More specifically, Van

Tassel asserts:
Officers administer breath tests frequently. From their point of view
the vast majority of drivers that submit to a breath test are able to
produce a valid result. Over time an officer may begin to believe
that everyone should be able to produce a valid result. This is
unfair. An ordinary citizen, pulled over for a traffic stop, put through
field sobriety tests, asked to blow into an instrument, while
receiving verbal instructions from two officers, while in custody,
while the instrument is beeping, is experiencing stress from being in
a foreign situation. Police officers forget or fail to understand that it
is stressful for the subject of their investigation.
That is
understandable, an officer may be involved in several investigations
per shift. But for the citizen it is a totally foreign experience. These
officers, and the magistrate, simply failed to appreciate that though
most people are able to perform under these circumstances, there
are exceptions. Ms. Van Tassel is such an exception. She was
given one shot at performing a test under less than ideal
circumstances, for her, and she couldn't do what the officers
wanted. They should have offered another or different test. She
did not consciously refuse and should not suffer the consequences
of a statute designed to punish those that intentionally withhold
important evidence from officers conducting a lawful investigation.
She is not the intended target of I.C. 18-8002.
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(Appellant's Brief, pp .6-7 (emphasis original).)
Van Tassel's argument does not demonstrate, as she claims, that the
magistrate's finding that her conduct constituted a refusal was not supported by
substantial competent evidence.

That conclusion was supported by Officer

Erickson's testimony and the audio recording of his efforts to obtain an adequate
breath sample from Van Tassel.

Neither Officer Erickson nor the magistrate

were required to believe Van Tassel's claim that she followed the officer's
instructions to blow until he told her to stop when such a claim was contradicted
by other evidence. As noted by the district court, the magistrate "[i)n essence ...
found that Ms. Van Tassel was not credible when she testified that she 'did what
they asked [her] to do ... like trying to expel everything ... I was trying."' (R.,
p.67 (quoting Tr. at pp.33-34) (ellipses original).)
Rather than demonstrating that the magistrate's finding is unsupported by
evidence, Van Tassel appears to be asking this Court to second-guess the
magistrate's credibility determination or to hold, as a matter of law, that there is
sufficient cause for a refusal anytime a motorist claims she could not provide an
adequate sample due to the "circumstances" surrounding a DUI investigation.
Both arguments lack merit. As to credibility, such determinations are within the
province of the trial court. Insight LLC v. Gunter, 154 Idaho 779, 783, 302 P.3d
1052, 1056 (2013) ("When a case is tried to a court, determinations as to the
credibility of witnesses, the weight of their testimony, their probative effect, and
inferences drawn from that testimony are the province of the district court.").
With respect to whether claiming to be unable to provide an adequate sample
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due to the circumstances surrounding a DUI investigation is, as a matter of law,
sufficient to show significant cause for a refusal, it is not.
"[C]ourts have ruled, as a matter of law, that if a motorist simply feigns
consent and fails to take a blood-alcohol test, his behavior is deemed to be a
refusal." Smith, 115 Idaho at 809, 770 P.2d at 818 (citation omitted). "Similarly,
if a motorist engages in delaying tactics to avoid deciding whether to refuse or to
take the test, his acts are deemed to constitute a refusal."

~

On the other

hand, "a demonstrated physical inability to perform the requested test would be
sufficient cause" for a refusal. In re Griffiths, 113 Idaho 364, 372, 744 P.2d 92,
100 (1987). However, the proffered cause for the refusal "must be articulated to
the police officer at the time of refusal so the officer is given an opportunity to
request a different test."

~

Van Tassel does not claim, nor could she, that she had a physical inability
to perform the test much less that she communicated such an inability to Officer
Erickson. Even Van Tassel's after the fact testimony that she has "shortness of
breath, but not technical asthma," meaning she "[c]an't run long distances or jog,"
by Van Tassel's own account does not "affect" her ability to provide an adequate
sample, which is the reason she never mentioned it to Officer Erickson.
p.43, Ls.22-24, p.44, Ls.1-7.)

(Tr.,

Instead, Van Tassel attributes her inability to

provide an adequate sample to the stressful circumstances associated with the
investigation, claiming she is the "exception" to the rule that "most people are
able to perform under these circumstances."
argument fails for at least two reasons.
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(Appellant's Brief, p.7.)

This

First, the factual underpinnings of Van Tassel's claimed inability to perform
due the circumstances surrounding the investigation are contradicted by the
record. Van Tassel was not, as she asserts, given "one shot at performing [the]
test." (Appellant's Brief, p.7.)

She was given three.

Nor was she "receiving

verbal instructions from two officers." On the audio recording, there is one officer
- Officer Erickson - giving her instructions.

It was not until after Van Tassel

failed her third "attempt" that both officers can be heard telling her that they heard
her giving intermittent blows. Van Tassel also never told Officer Erickson that
she was having difficulty due to the "circumstances." And, Van Tassel's hearing
testimony that she found the situation "extremely intimidating" (Tr., p.32, Ls.1314) is inconsistent with her argumentative attitude, which can be heard on the
audio. In any event, the real dispute was whether she stopped blowing before
instructed to - she claimed she did not and both Officer Erickson and the other
officer on scene said she did. The magistrate resolved that dispute against Van
Tassel.
Second, Van Tassel's argument is based on an unwarranted expansion of
current law.

Van Tassel relies on two cases to support her claim - Griffiths,

supra, and In re Helfrich, 131 Idaho 349, 955 P.2d 1128 (Ct. App. 1998).
(Appellant's Brief, pp.3-5.) As noted, the Supreme Court in Griffiths recognized
that "a demonstrated physical inability to perform the requested test would be
sufficient cause" for a refusal and that such cause "must be articulated to the
police officer at the time of refusal so the officer is given an opportunity to request
a different test." Griffiths, 113 Idaho at 372, 744 P.2d at 100.
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In Helfrich, the licensee consented to a breathalyzer test but "would either
briefly spurt air into the tube or would not blow long enough to complete the test."
131 Idaho at 349, 955 P.2d at 1128. "Throughout the test, the officer informed
Helfrich that she was taking the test incorrectly and that she needed to blow air
through the tube for a longer period of time."

kl

Helfrich "informed the officer

that she was doing the best she could and that she was blowing all the air she
could blow."

kl

"After several unsuccessful attempts, the officer concluded that

Helfrich could not complete the test because she did not want to, and that this
failure was, in essence, a refusal."

kl

at 349-350, 955 P.2d at 1128-1129

(footnote omitted). The officer, therefore, seized Helfrich's driver's license and
Helfrich requested a refusal hearing.

kl at 350,

955 P.2d at 1129.

At the refusal hearing, the "officer testified that based upon his experience
and observations, it was his belief that Helfrich's attempts to complete the test
were disingenuous." Heflrich, 131 Idaho at 350, 955 P.2d at 1129.

"Helfrich

testified that at the time of the test she suffered from bronchitis, which frustrated
her genuine attempts to successfully complete the test."

kl

Helfrich, however,

admitted she did not communicate that she might be suffering from bronchitis,
but did tell the officer she was "doing the best that she could."

kl

"[T]he

magistrate determined that because Helfrich failed to specifically inform the
officer that she suffered from 'bronchitis,' a physical condition that prevented her
from completing the test, she failed to show cause for not completing the
requested evidentiary test."

kl

The magistrate did not "reach[ ] the issue of

whether Helfrich suffered from a medical condition that prevented her from taking
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the test," concluding that, under Griffiths, "the threshold issue was not whether
Helfrich suffered from a medical condition but whether she so informed the police
officer." Helfrich, 131 Idaho at 350, 955 P.2d at 1129 (emphasis original). The
district court affirmed.

kl

On further review, the Court of Appeals disagreed, reasoning:
By telling the officer that she was doing the best she could
and blowing all the air she had, Helfrich sufficiently articulated a
physical inability to complete the task so as to put the officer on
notice that a different test should be utilized. In contrast to the
situation in Griffiths, nothing in Helfrich's behavior suggested to the
officer that she would refuse to submit to a different type of alcohol
concentration test. It was not essential that Helfrich give the officer
a medical diagnosis for her physical condition, such as "bronchitis,"
in order to satisfy the Griffiths articulation standard. Indeed, a
suspect may be physically unable to complete the breath test
because he or she suffers from an undiagnosed illness. In such
circumstances, the suspect could hardly be required to inform the
officer of the name of the physical condition that was unknown at
the time.
Helfrich, 131 Idaho at 351-352, 955 P.2d at 1130-1131.
The Court further stated that, upon "Helfrich's demonstrated inability to
complete the test, coupled with her explanation," the officer had two options: "(1)
he could ask her to submit to a different test; or (2) he could interpret her
purported inability to complete the test as a refusal and have the issue decided at
an evidentiary hearing." Helfrich, 131 Idaho at 352, 955 P.2d at 1131 (footnote
omitted). "However, the officer's decision to treat Helfrich's actions as a refusal
may not be upheld by the court if Helfrich proves that she suffered from a
physical impediment which prevented her from successfully completing the
breath test."

kl (emphasis added).
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Helfrich does not support Van Tassel's claim because Van Tassel did not
prove she "suffered from a physical impediment which prevented her from
successfully completing the breath test."

Nor did she communicate any

impediment to Officer Erickson and Van Tassel did not exhibit "any coughing or
any physical signs that made it apparent to [him] that there was some difficulty in
providing a sample."

(Exhibit A; Tr., p.67, Ls.1-12.)

Instead, Van Tassel's

actions were the equivalent of feigning consent and then engaging in tactics to
defeat proper administration of the test - actions consistent with her initial
indication that she was not going to submit to the test. This Court should reject
Van Tassel's efforts to forge new law by expanding Helfrich to allow cause to be
shown whenever a defendant claims she was too nervous, confused, or
intimidated by a standard, non-threatening DUI investigation to provide an
adequate breath sample even though no physical condition prevented her from
doing so. Such a claim of cause is not "cause of a sufficient magnitude that it
may be fairly said that a suspension of [a] license would be unjust or inequitable."
Griffiths, 113 Idaho at 372, 744 P.2d at 100. Even accepting such a standard,
there must still be allowance for an officer, and a magistrate at a refusal hearing,
to reject a defendant's claim that such was the reason for the failure.
Further, although an officer certainly has the option to offer an alternative
test if a motorist contends she is too nervous to provide an adequate sample,
Van Tassel never made such a claim to Officer Erickson.

Moreover, that Van

Tassel thinks Officer Erickson "should have offered another or different test"
(Appellant's Brief, p.6), does not mean he was required to do so - especially
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under the circumstances. See Griffiths, 113 Idaho at 370, 744 P.2d at 98 (the
choice of which test to perform belongs to the officer); Helfrich, 131 Idaho at 352,
955 P.2d at 1131 (upon failure to provide an adequate breath sample, an officer
can offer a different test or treat failure as a refusal and "have the issue decided
at an evidentiary hearing").

As for Van Tassel's claim that she "thought" she

asked about submitting to a blood test, the audio supports that she only "thought"
she asked (see generally Exhibit A), and her testimony at the refusal hearing that
she would have done so if asked (Tr., p.35, Ls.4-6) is little comfort and ultimately
irrelevant given that she never asked for such a test and Officer Erickson was not
required to offer that alternative and he certainly had no reason to believe she
would be any more cooperative if he did. See Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829,
832, 41 P.3d 257, 260 (2002) ("The defendant's willingness to take another form
of test generally does not negate the effect of his refusal to submit to the form of
test requested by the officer.").
With respect to Van Tassel's contention that she is "not the intended
target of I.C. 18-8002" and, therefore, she should not be penalized with a license
suspension for her refusal, the state disagrees. As noted in State v. Breed, 111
Idaho 497, 501, 725 P.2d 202, 206 (Ct App. 1986) (emphasis added), "[t]he
purpose of section 18-8002 . . . is to provide an incentive for motorists to
cooperate in determining levels of blood-alcohol content by a reasonably precise
scientific method." Because Van Tassel was not cooperative, she is an "intended
target of I.C. 18-8002." That Van Tassel claims she was cooperative does not
change the purpose of the statute or who the statute targets.
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The district court correctly affirmed the magistrate's determination that
Van Tassel failed to meet her burden of establishing sufficient cause for her
refusal to provide an adequate breath sample.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court's order
affirming the magistrate's opinion finding that Van Tassel failed to meet her
burden of showing sufficient cause for refusing evidentiary testing.
DATED this 3rd day of March, 2014.

JES~I AM. LORELLO
Depaty Attorney General
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